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Abstract—This paper presents LinSBFT, a Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) protocol with the capacity of processing over 2000 smart
contract transactions per second in production. LinSBFT applies to a permissionless, public blockchain system, in which there is no
public-key infrastructure, based on the classic PBFT with 4 improvements: (i) LinSBFT achieves O(n) worst-case communication
volume, in contract to PBFT’s O(n4); (ii) LinSBFT rotates the leader of protocol randomly to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks
on leader; and (iii) each run of LinSBFT finalizes one block, which is robust against participants that are honest in one run of the
protocol, and dishonest in another, and the set of participants is dynamic, which is update periodically. (iv) LinSBFT helps the delayed
nodes to catch up via a synchronization mechanism to promise the liveness. Further, in the ordinary case, LinSBFT involves only a
single round of voting instead of two in PBFT, which reduces both communication overhead and confirmation time, and employs the
proof-of-stake scheme to reward all participants. Extensive experiments using data obtained from the Ethereum demonstrate that
LinSBFT consistently and significantly outperforms existing in-production BFT protocols for blockchains.
Index Terms—Byzantine Fault tolerance, linear communication, random leader rotation, dynamic participant set
F
1 INTRODUCTION
T He blockchain technology, pioneered by Bitcoin [23],promises to revolutionize finance with a secure, decentralized
and trustless protocol for processing transactions, which include
money transfers and smart contracts. Many blockchain systems
nowadays, however, suffer from poor scalability and slow confir-
mations, and consume vast amounts of energy [24]. At the heart
of the problem is the widely-used proof-of-work (PoW) census
mechanism, in which special power nodes, called miners, compete
to solve cryptographic puzzles in order to gain the privilege
of confirming transactions. Aside from scalability, latency and
sustainability issues, PoW inevitably forks [14]; consequently,
a confirmed transaction can still be reversed, though with di-
minishing probability as more confirmations arrive. In practice,
applications usually wait for multiple confirmations, exacerbating
the latency problem.
Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) protocols promise to solve
the problems of PoW, since BFT involves negligible computations
and guarantees no fork. However, classic BFT protocols scale
poorly with the number of nodes in the network, due to their
enormous communication cost. For example, PBFT, a textbook
protocol, incurs worst-case O(n4) total transmissions for n nodes
[1]. Consequently, most deployed BFT-based blockchains support
very few participants of the protocol (e.g., 21 in [16]), which
can be elected delegates [16], PoW winners [18], or a random
sample set obtained through cryptographic sortition [14], [17].
As discussed in [14], [17], having fixed delegates defeats de-
centralization, and PoW introduces uncertainty in the participant
set due to forks. Sortition-based BFT, on the other hand, only
provides probabilistic guarantees on safety (i.e., no fork); further,
its probability of failure is only small enough with a large sample
(hundreds at least [17]), which might be already beyond the
capacity of in-production BFT chains (e.g., 21 nodes in EOS [16],
and up to 16 in an earlier Hyperledger Fabric according to [11]).
The state-of-the-art BFT protocol with deterministic safety
guarantee is HotStuff (HS) [1], whose communication cost is
O(n) for each “level”, which roughly corresponds to a block.
HS reduces one phase of voting in each level by pipeline of
voting phases through multiple levels. In particular, an execution
of the HS protocol covers multiple blocks, which amortizes costs.
Each time a “beacon” proposes a block to nodes, who vote to
finalize the block. HS improves the worst case communication
complexity to O(n2), using a combination of linear view change
and threshold signatures. While HS is attractive in theory, it is
difficult to apply it to a public, permissionless blockchain, for four
reasons. First, the beacon has too much power: it decides which
transactions to include in the next block proposal and aggregates
votes sent by others into a commit certificate (CC). In [1], the
authors suggest using PoW to implement the beacon, which leads
to forks and contention, complicating system design. Besides, a
malicious beacon may send CC to part of participants selectively
resulting in partition of all participants. Consequently different
nodes may run at different block height, which influences the
liveness of protocol. Second, there can be a cascading sequence
of f fault beacons, leading to f + 1 = O(n) levels in HS. If HS
changes the beacon in round robin manner instead of PoW which
avoids forks, adversary can attack HS with consecutive f beacons
easily. This will increase the communication cost for a block and
latency of transactions sent by users. Third, HS depends on
the existence of a centralized public-key infrastructure (PKI) to
generate keys for threshold signature, which is not practical in
a permissionless, public blockchain setting. Besides, HS lacks a
sufficient incentive mechanism in open setting. If the rewards are
owned by the leader, others may attack the leader deliberately to
gain more benefits.
Last, the protocol spans over multiple blocks, which is a
problem, because to guarantee safety, BFT requires that at least
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22/3n nodes be honest throughout the protocol. In reality, a node
could be honest for one block, and dishonest for another; further,
in a public chain the set of nodes can also change. For example,
there are four participants A, B, C and D, among which A, B and
C are honest and D is malicious at the beginning. The malicious
participant D can help A and B to construct a quorum, which can
involve two phases of voting for a block X . The proposal for block
X is not received by participant C. Assume that just A commits
block X , and B does not receive the CC from the beacon due to
the asynchrony of network. At this time, B becomes malicious and
D becomes honest, where there is only a malicious participant in
HS as well. Then B can vote for any block Y conflicting with X ,
and participant B, C and D construct another quorum which can
commit block Y . However, honest participant A and C commit
conflict blocks, which compromises the safety of protocol.
This paper proposes LinSBFT, which achieves amortized O(n)
total transmissions under deterministic safety, involves no PoW
module, in a public setting. Meanwhile, LinSBFT does not require
a public-key infrastructure (PKI), and is compatible to the Proof-
of-Stake (PoS) scheme commonly used in public blockchains,
which defends against Sybil attacks. Specifically, LinSBFT is
based on PBFT with four key improvements as follows.
• LinSBFT reduces communication costs of consensus for
each block height with three key techniques, each by O(n):
linear view change [1], threshold signatures [17] and leader
selection via verifiable random functions (VRFs) [14].
• The proposed protocol reduces the risk of denial-of-service
(DoS) attacks on the leader in public setting by changing
leader randomly(i.e., block proposer) for every block.
With random leader rotation, the adversary is infeasible
to predict next leader in advance.
• LinSBFT is against nodes with changing honesty as well
as a dynamic node set. LinSBFT guarantees the safety of
protocol by an novel locking mechanism even though the
honesty of a participant is allowed to change from block
to block. Instead of static participant set, LinSBFT allows
nodes to join and leave the protocol periodically, where the
time is divided into epochs and participant set is update at
the beginning of each epoch.
• To deal with situation that malicious leader partitions all
nodes, LinSBFT designs a synchronization mechanism
to help delayed nodes catch up without increasing the
communication complexity, which promises the liveness
of protocol.
In addition, similar to HS, in the ordinary case with a non-
faulty leader and synchronous network, LinSBFT reduces com-
munication costs and block confirmation time by piggybacking
the “Commit” vote for the previous block onto the “Prepare” vote
for the current block, which we elaborate in Section 3. The major
contributions are summarized below:
1) LinSBFT achieves O(n) worst-case communication vol-
ume, with three key techniques: linear view change,
threshold signatures and leader selection via VRFs, which
avoids f leader failure and DoS attacks of leader.
2) Each run of LinSBFT finalizes one block with strict
safety (no fork), which is robust against changeable
honesty and dynamic node set. Besides, a synchronization
mechanism is applied to help delayed participant to catch
up for the liveness.
3) We give a formal proof of the correctness of safety,
liveness and linear complexity for LinSBFT.
4) An implementation of LinSBFT and extensive experi-
ments, based on real data from the Ethereum, demonstrate
that LinSBFT consistently and significantly outperforms
existing in-production blockchain BFT protocols.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2
provides necessary background and explains the problem setting.
Section 3 presents the major components of LinSBFT, and Section
4 details the complete protocol. Section 5 proves the security
and performance guarantees of LinSBFT. Section 6 contains a
thorough set of experiments. Section 7 reviews related work.
Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper with directions for future
work.
2 PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM SETTING
2.1 Preliminaries
Threshold signature. An (n, t)-ts threshold signature on a mes-
sage m is a single, constant-sized aggregate signature that passes
verification if and only if at least t out of the n participants
sign m. Note that the verifier does not need to know the identi-
ties of the t signers. Without a threshold signature scheme, the
verifier has to either receive and verify t individual signatures,
which requires O(n) transmissions when t = O(n). Threshold
signature brings down this cost to O(1). LinSBFT employs a
popular implementation of threshold signature based on the BLS
signature scheme [3]. However, threshold signature is not free
lunch, a fact that is sometimes ignored in the literature. In
particular, a threshold signature scheme requires special, corre-
lated public/private key pairs. Generating such key pairs in a
decentralized setting requires a distributed key generation (DKG)
protocol, which is communication-heavy. For example, the Joint-
Feldman algorithm [13], e.g., used in Dfinity [17], incurs O(n3)
network transmissions to broadcast the coefficients of an order-t
polynomial when t = 2 f +1 = O(n). LinSBFT employs the DKG
solution in [6], which requires O(n polylogn) communications,
and provides a probabilistic guarantee on the correctness of the
generated key pairs(i.e., threshold signatures can be successfully
created with these keys), where the probability of failure can be
made arbitrarily small, e.g., below 10−18.
Verifiable hash function (V RF). A V RF is a pseudo-random
generator whose output is verifiable (i.e., on whether a given
number is indeed the output of the VRF), random, uniformly
distributed, and unpredictable beforehand. A simple V RF (e.g.,
used in Algorand [14]) under the random oracle model (i.e., there
exists an ideal hash function H whose outputs are random and
uniform), is H(s), where H is the ideal hash function uniqueness1
and s is a signature that satisfies, i.e., there is a unique signature
for a given message and a private key. The BLS signature scheme
[3], for instance, satisfies this property. The output of H(s) is
clearly random and uniform, due to the random oracle assump-
tion. Meanwhile, given the source message m (from which s is
obtained) and s’s corresponding public key, one can verify that a
given value is indeed the result of H(s). Further, the function’s
output is unpredictable beforehand, since it is infeasible to obtain
s without knowledge of its secret key.
1. In practice, H can be approximated with a cryptographical one, such as
SHA-3 [26].
3PBFT in blockchain. A classic BFT protocol is PBFT [7].
Assume that there are n ≥ 3 f + 1 nodes in total, among which
f = b n−13 c are malicious. PBFT involves three steps to reach
consensus, Pre-Prepare, Prepare and Commit in the ordinary case
that the leader is not faulty, and the network is synchronous. PBFT
can be used to obtain consensus on a block in a blockchain setting
(e.g., implemented in [4]), as follows. The protocol involves one
or more rounds, each of which has a leader, which can be chosen,
e.g., in a round-robin manner. The leader in the v-th round at
height l (denoted by Ll,v) proposes a block Bl,v, and broadcasts
its hash value Hl,v = H(Bl,v) in a Pre-Prepare message. Upon
receiving such a Pre-Prepare, a node responds by broadcasting
Prepare messages on Hl,v. Once a node receives n− f Prepare’s
on Hl,v, it assembles them into a prepared certificate (PC), and
broadcasts Commit messages about the PC. A node who receives
n− f Commit on the PC of Hl,v assembles them into a committed
certificate CC and is ready to finalize block Bl,v, after verifying all
transactions in the block.
When consensus cannot be reached in a round v at height l
within a given timespan, the protocol enters a new round v+ 1
with a different leader Ll,v+1, which is called a view change.
Possible causes for a view change include a malicious leader,
or message losses due to network failures. The original PBFT
protocol involves O(n3) transmissions per view change. In the
worst case, there can be f = O(n) faulty leaders, leading to a
total transmission cost of O(n4). To ensure the safety of protocol
i.e., honest nodes never finalize conflicting blocks at same height,
PBFT requires all nodes stay static where a honest node cannot
become malicious. This assumption is unrealistic in an open
setting since each node always chases the maximization of benefits
by various means. Besides, PBFT changes the leader (i.e., block
proposer) in a round robin manner, which suffers from denial-
of-service attacks on the leader. This attack may compromise the
liveness of protocol.
Linear View Change. A recent algorithm called linear view
change (LVC) reduces the cost to O(n2) [1]. At the beginning of
a new round v+1, each node sends a NewView message to Ll,v+1,
along with the prepared certificate PC. Ll,v+1 then broadcasts the
PC with the highest round number among all collected PCs, along
with the hash Hl,v+1 of its proposed block Bl,v+1. Since a PC
contains n− f Prepare messages, it has size O(n); thus, collecting
and broadcasting a PC cost O(n2) transmissions. Note that each
node does not need to send PCs for previous blocks to Ll,v+1
because all blocks are chained by hash values in block headers
and the PC for the latest block can represent the entire blockchain.
Via threshold signature, the size of certificates PC and CC
can be reduced to constant. PBFT with linear communication
applies a standard trick (e.g., used in [15] [19]) with a collector
that collects and aggregates Prepare and Commit votes from all
validators. A natural choice for the collector is the leader Ll,v.
In the ordinary case, leader L1,v collects Prepare votes from all
validators on H1,v. Then, L1,v derives an (n, t = n− f )-threshold
signature ts(Hl,v) on Hl,v from these Prepare messages, and
creates a prepared certificate PCl,v containing ts(Hl,v). After that,
Ll,v broadcasts PCl,v to all validators, each of which responds
with a Commit message with its signature on PCl,v. Again, the
Ll,v plays the roles to collect Commit messages and derives an
(n,n− f )-ts threshold signature ts(PCl,v), and makes a committed
certificate CCl,v including ts(PCl,v). Then Ll,v broadcasts CCl,v to
all validators. Once a validator receives CCl,v, it finalizes block
Bl,v. This completes the protocol.
2.2 Problem Settings
Adversary model. Different from PBFT, out of the n participants
of LinSBFT numbered from 0 to n− 1, at most f (such as n ≥
4 f +1) can be malicious for each execution of the protocol, which
can misbehave in arbitrary ways. The remaining participants are
honest, who strictly follow the protocol. Since the malicious nodes
can collude, one can view them as corrupted and controlled by a
single mastermind, referred to as the adversary. Instead, LinSBFT
assumes that the adversary is static and rushing (i.e., it has to
choose the f nodes to corrupt before a protocol run), rather than
adaptive (which can instantly compromise any node at any time).
Further, the adversary is assumed to take some time (a constant)
to compromise nodes, which is detailed further in Section 3.2.
Since the blockchain setting contains an infinite number of
transactions split into blocks, it is important to clarify the timespan
over which f is defined. In LinSBFT, the honesty of a participant is
allowed to change from block to block, e.g., an honest participant
may become malicious when it encounters a transaction that
strongly motivates it to cheat. Accordingly, over multiple blocks,
it is possible that every participant is malicious at some point,
and yet the system remains secure as long as n ≥ 4 f + 1 holds
for each block. Meanwhile, the changing honesty assumption
makes it necessary to place the condition that the adversary cannot
carry over knowledge of private keys of malicious nodes from
one execution of the protocol to another. Compared to PBFT,
the adversary model fo LinSBFT is more realistic for public
blockchains. A BFT protocol must satisfy safety (i.e., no fork) and
liveness (the protocol eventually terminates) when the number of
malicious nodes is less than a super-majority of all participants.
Specifically, in a partially synchronous network, LinSBFT satisfies
both safety and liveness deterministically, with zero chance of
failure. Further, LinSBFT also satisfies deterministic safety even
when the network is asynchronous, i.e., it never forks.
Communication model. Following common practice in the
literature, LinSBFT assumes that the network is partially syn-
chronous [12], i.e., after an unknown future Global Stabilization
Time (GST), any message between two honest nodes is delivered
within ∆ time. This model also captures the more common
situation that periods of synchrony and asynchrony interleave, and
there are sufficiently long periods of synchrony that allow the
protocol to finish [1]. It is worth pointing out that the parameter ∆
above does not take into account the network topology, or the total
amount of network traffic. For instance, an all-to-all broadcast,
which clearly involves Ω(n2) messages, can be said to take O(n)
time, since every node sends/receives n− 1 messages, each of
which takes constant time, i.e., up to ∆ . This analysis is not valid
when the network has a saturated critical link, e.g., when half of
the nodes reside in America and the other half in China. In this
case, since Ω(n2) traffic pass through this critical link with limited
bandwidth, the total time is no less than Ω(n2). For this reason,
LinSBFT focuses on minimizing communication volume rather
than time.
3 LINSBFT
3.1 Overview
A blockchain consists of blocks linked through the PreHash
attribute at each block, which is the hash value of the previous
block, called its parent. For a given block, the set of all previous
blocks are its ancestors. This linked structure indicates that when
a node votes for a particular block, it implicitly votes for all its
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Fig. 1: Example of the ordinary case of LinSBFT. For each block
height l, its first selected leader Ll,0 broadcasts Propose messages,
which are voted by the validators. These votes are collected by
the collector Cl,0 = Ll+1,0. The equivalent Pre-prepare, Prepare
and Commit phases in PBFT are annotated as PPl , Pl and Cl ,
respectively. Fl (and the corresponding arrows between nodes to
themselves) indicates that validators Finalize the block at height l.
ancestors [1], [5] as well. In the following, we use the terms
“node” and “validator” interchangeably. At the beginning, we give
an overview of LinSBFT for better understanding.
Ordinary case. In the ordinary case, LinSBFT finishes in a
single round at each block height, in two steps: Propose and
Vote. Validators only vote once in the Vote step, and there is
no explicit Commit steps as in PBFT (Section 2.1). LinSBFT
finishes consensus height by height, and in each block height, it
may involve multiple rounds to reach consensus among validators.
Specifically, let Rl,v represent the v-th round at height l. In the
Propose step, the leader for round Rl,0, denoted as Ll,0, chooses a
batch of unconfirmed transactions from its local transaction pool
to compose a block Bl,0, and broadcasts a signed proposal Pl,0.
Upon receiving Pl,0, each validator enters round Rl,0. Then, in the
Vote step, each validator sends vote Vl,0 for the proposed block to
a collector Cl,0, which is also the leader for the next block height,
i.e., Cl,0 = Ll+1,0. The collector node, upon receiving votes from at
least n− f validators, derives an (n,n− f )-ts threshold signature
ts(Hl,0), and creates a vote certificate Certl,0 as follow:
Certl,v =
〈
l,v,Hl,v, ts(Hl,v)
〉
where v is the round number, which is 0 in our description so far.
The size of the above vote certificate is constant, since a
threshold signature is of constant size (refer to Section 2.1). After
that, Cl,0 (i.e., Ll+1,0) enters the Propose step for height l+1, and
broadcasts Pl+1,0 containing Certl,0. Each validator verifies the
correctness of Pl+1,0 after receiving it from Cl,0. Similarly, each
validator enters round Rl+1,0 and sends vote Vl+1,0 for Pl+1,0 to
collector Cl+1,0 in Vote step. Collector Cl+1,0 deals with these votes
similarly as Cl,0 at block height l, and broadcasts the proposal
Pl+2,0 for the next block height l+2. Upon receiving Pl+2,0 from
Cl+1,0, each validator finalizes Bl,0 after verifying Certl+1,0.
We emphasize that the process to finalize a block, e.g., Bl,0,
still requires 2 phases of voting. Compared to PBFT, LinSBFT
does not simply eliminates a round of voting; instead, it pipelines
the voting phases for adjacent blocks. For instance, in Figure 1, for
block B8,0, the Vote step at height 8 plus the Propose step at height
9 is equivalent to the Prepare step in PBFT, and the Vote step at
height 9 plus the Propose step at height 10 is equivalent to Commit
phase in PBFT. A validator finalizes B8,0 when it receives vote
certificate Cert9,0 along with P10,0. Essentially, a vote in LinSBFT
signifies both the prepare-vote for current height and the commit-
vote for the last height. Besides, the collector of each round varies,
which is determined by VRF detailed in next subsection.
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Fig. 2: Example of different validators at different heights, due
to two consecutive faulty leaders L9,0 = u2 and L10,0 = u3, who
selectively send block proposals to some but not all validators.
Assume that after u3, the next collector is C10,0 = un. Then, un is
at height 8, but receives votes for a block at height 10.
View change. For each round Rl,v of the protocol, there is
unique collector Cl,v, which is determined by a VRF, explained
later. If validators fail to reach consensus for a proposal, the
view change subprotocol is triggered, and validators move to a
new round. A major challenge in LinSBFT is that validators may
run at different block heights, e.g., due to network partitioning
or malicious collectors/leaders. For example, in Figure 2, there
are two consecutive faulty leaders L9,0 = u2 and L10,0 = u3. The
former (i.e., u2) sends out proposal P9,0 only to nodes u1-u3 f+1,
but not the rest. Similarly, u3 selectively sends out proposal P10,0
to nodes u f+1-u3 f+1. Consequently, different nodes now run at
different heights, e.g., node un is still at height 8 as it has not
received P9,0.
To tackle this problem, LinSBFT follows a solution similar to
BFT-SMART [27], in which each validator participates not only
in the protocol for the current height l, but also the previous height
l− 1. In particular, all honest validators running at height l keep
functioning (i.e., voting and proposing) for rounds at height l−1.
This is needed since the protocol can enter height l with n−
2 f votes; consequently, there may be up to n− 3 f − 1 honest
validators left behind at height l− 1. Further, when a validator
runs at height l, it only proposes and votes for blocks at heights l
and l− 1, which is important to guarantee safety, as we show in
Section 3.3. Whenever a validator receive messages for a higher
height (e.g., un in Figure 2), it realizes that it has fallen behind
others, and switches to synchronization mode, in which it actively
requests new blocks from its peers until it catches up with the
current block height, which is detailed in Section 3.4.
Messages. A message sent by a validator is defined in form:
messagem = 〈Type,Value〉s
in which s is the sender of messages, Type is the type of message
which can be PROPOSE or VOTE, and Value is actual value to be
sent as shown in Equation (1).
Pl,v =
〈
l,v,Bl,v,Cert,σ (Cert)
〉
(1a)
Vl,v =
〈
l,v,σ
(
Hl,v
)
,Cert
〉
(1b)
where P represents Proposal and V denotes Vote. Each message
must be signed by the corresponding sender in order to establish
authenticity. For brevity, message signatures are omitted in the
above equations.
In Equation (1a), Cert is the highest vote certificate at the
collector and σ (Cert) is the signature of collector Cl−1,v′ (i.e.,
Ll,v), which forces the collector to derive a valid threshold sig-
nature; otherwise, σ (Cert) would be the evidence of collector’s
misbehavior, and the collector would be slashed. A Cert is the
highest for a validator if and only if it has the highest height,
breaking ties by round number. In Equation 1b, σ
(
Hl,v
)
is the
5signature for proposed block hash and Cert is the highest vote
certificate owned by the sender as well.
3.2 View Change
Similar to PBFT, the view change subprotocol of LinSBFT is
triggered when the nodes cannot reach consensus in a single
round. This can be due to an asynchronous network (e.g., when
more than n/4 nodes are offline), or the presence of malicious
collectors/leaders. Specifically, a faulty leader may: (i) propose
multiple blocks or an invalid block; (ii) remain silent indefinitely;
(iii) send valid proposal to some of the validators, but not to the
rest.
For the first case, the faulty leader caught cheating is slashed.
For the remaining two cases, the validators cannot distinguish
whether they do not receive a proposal due to a faulty leader
or network asynchrony. To ensure liveness, each validator sets a
timer for every round. When the timer expires, a view change is
triggered, and the protocol enters a new round, say, round Rl,v+1.
If a collector for round Rl,v cannot collect n− f votes within a
timespan, it proposes a new block for Rl,v+1. Similar to HotStuff,
LinSBFT handles a view change with the Linear View Change
(LVC) algorithm [1]. The essence of LVC is that the leader of the
next round sends its highest vote certificate instead of all vote
certificates, which reduces transmission volume during a view
change by a factor of O(n).
Random collector selection. In all previous protocols based
on PBFT, there can be a cascading sequence of f fault leaders,
leading to f + 1 = O(n) rounds. LinSBFT avoids this situation
by selecting collectors (leaders) randomly, using a VRF (refer to
Section 2.1). With random collectors, the probability of having
a sequence of malicious collectors diminishes exponentially with
the length of the sequence. Specifically, with f < n/4 malicious
validators, having a sequence of I malicious collectors has proba-
bility smaller than (1/4)I . Therefore, the probability that the next
collector is malicious becomes negligible (i.e., smaller than a given
ρ) after a constant number (I > − log4ρ) of collector changes.
In practice, a common choice of ρ is 10−18, whose inverse is
larger than the total number of seconds since the beginning of the
universe [14].
Random collector selection requires a common source of
randomness among the validators. In LinSBFT, this is provided
by a VRF on the vote certificate for the previous block at height
l−2. In particular, we have:
Cl,v = H
(
Certl−2,v′ |v
)
mod n, (2)
where “|” denotes concatenation, and Certl−2,v′ is the vote certifi-
cate at the previous block height l− 2 held by validator u since
each validator only has a vote certificate for previous block height
l− 2 which is discussed in Section 3.3, and Certl−2,v′ is the vote
certificate indicating that n− f participants have voted for previous
block at height l − 2. In LinSBFT, Certl−2,v′ is first generated
by the collector of the last round at height l− 2. Based on the
assumption that the adversary takes time to corrupt validators,
which equals the duration from the creation of Certl−2,v′ at the last
collector at height l−2 and the beginning of the protocol at height
l, the output of the VRF above is unpredictable to the adversary
beforehand. Meanwhile, the VRF is clearly known to all validators
that have finalized at height l, which is a necessary condition
for entering the protocol for height l. This manner also avoids
denial-of-service attacks on the collector(leader), which threatens
H(Certl-2,v|0)mod n
H(Certl-2,v|1)mod n
H(Certl-2,v|2)mod n
H(Certl-1,v |0)mod n H(Certl,v |0)mod n
Height l Height l+1 Height l+2
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Fig. 3: Example of random collector (leader) selection for three
consecutive blocks.
the liveness of protocol, since the collector is unpredictable. An
example is shown in Figure 3. With random collectors, the number
of view changes in a synchronized network becomes O(1), unless
with negligible probability. Since each view change takes O(n)
transmissions, the total communication cost for all view changes
is still O(n), unless with negligible probability.
3.3 Block Locking Mechanism
First we explain the necessity of a block locking mechanism with
an example. Consider a setting with five validators, u1-u5, who
all voted on a block proposal Pl,v at height l and round Rl,v.
The collector for this round then assembles a vote certificate
Certl,v and broadcasts it. Now, suppose that u1 fails to receive
Certl,v, and the remaining validators u2-u5 receive it and continue
to vote on another proposal Pl+1,0 whose block is linked to the
one in Pl,v. Suppose that u2-u5 all vote on Pl+1,0, leading to vote
certificate Certl+1,0. This time, u5 is the only one who receives
Certl+1,0, whereas u2, u3 and v4 fail to receive it. Then, according
to the protocol, u5 finalizes the block contained in Pl,v. The other
three users, i.e., u1-u4, eventually time out for round Rl,v, and
enters a new round Rl,v+1. Since u1-u4 form a super-majority
of the 5 validators, they could reach consensus on a different
block than the one in Pl,v, leading to a fork as u5 has already
finalized Pl,v. In LinSBFT, this problem is addressed using a
locking mechanism. Note that locking in LinSBFT is necessarily
more complicated than other PBFT-based protocols, due to the use
of VRF-based leader selection, which chooses different leaders at
different heights that could be deadlocked in an incorrect protocol.
Specifically, we introduce two basic concepts, conflict and
comparability. Two blocks B and B′ are conflicting if one is not
an ancestor of the other according to the PreHash links, donated
by B `B′. We say a vote certificate Cert for block B′ conflicts
with other block B when B′ ` B, denoted by Cert `B. If blocks B
and B′ have identical PreHash and B is proposed in a round with
larger round number than B′, we say B is larger than B′, denoted
by B > B′. Otherwise, if B and B′ do not share the same parent
block, they are called incomparable.
For each validator, there are two types of locks, Propose-
lock and Vote-lock. A propose-lock PLock(B, l) (or vote-lock
V Lock(B, l)) contains a block B, which means its corresponding
validator is currently locked on block B at height l. In general,
when a validator has a propose-lock PLock(B, l), it can only pro-
pose the locked block B when it becomes the proposer. Similarly,
a validator only can vote for the locked block B at height l when
it has a vote-lock V Lock(B, l).
Propose-Lock. If a validator runs in round Rl−1,v, it is locked
when it receives a proposal Pl,0 containing block B with valid vote
certificate Certl−1,v. Then it move to height l and has a propose-
lock PLock(B, l). A validator only propose locked block if it is the
proposer for a round at height l, but it can vote for any valid block.
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a lock after seeing a Cert for block B′ such that B′ > B . Then
validator is relocked on B′. If validator has no Propose-Lock at
height l, it is locked on B′ as well.
Vote-Lock. A validator is locked when it receives a valid
Cert for block B at height l and hasn’t voted for any block B′
such that B′ > B . Then it has a vote-lock V Lock(B, l). Validator
only votes for locked block proposed at height l. This prevents
validators from voting for block, and then contributing to another
vote certificate for a conflicted block in next rounds, thereby
compromising safety.
Vote-Unlock. A validator having V Lock(B, l) may only release
a lock after seeing a Cert for a block B′ such that B′ > B if
it hasn’t voted for B′. This allows validators to unlock if they
vote something the rest of the network doesn’t want to finalize,
thereby protecting liveness, but does it in a way that does not
compromise safety, by only allowing unlocking if there has been a
vote certificate in a round after that in which the validator became
locked.
The Propose-Lock increases the probability of finalization of
the block that there are validators locked on. For example, without
Propose-Lock, fault collector only sends proposal with a vote
certificate for block B to one honest validator u when n = 4 f +1.
Then u is locked on B and f faulty validators all keep silent.
Honest validators change views and propose new block, but never
get a valid vote certificate due to lack of the locked validator’s
vote. Once the locked validator becomes the collector, it proposes
B again and a valid certificate may be derived. However, it will
take O( f ) view changes to move a round whose collector is
the locked validator theoretically. Through Propose-Lock, honest
collector proposes the propose-locked block which avoids O(n)
round changes. Furthermore, since an honest node at a round may
become malicious at another round, thereby a locked node may
violate the locking mechanism after the change. However, if a
validator is honest and accepts a block B at a round, it must accept
all B’s ancestors and locked on them correctly. Here, we give some
properties of Propose-Lock and Vote-Lock.
Lemma 1. If an honest validator has PLock(B, l) and
V Lock(B′, l) at the same time, then B must be identical to B′.
Proof. Block B and B′ have same parent block, hence they are
comparable. By assumption, if B > B′, there must be a vote
certificate cert for B. If validator has V Lock(B′, l) yet, it vote-
unlocks when receives cert according to the rules of lock and has
V Lock(B, l). Otherwise, If B < B′, there must be a vote certificate
cert ′ for B′. Then validator propose-unlocks and has PLock(B′, l).
Hence, B must be identical to B′.
Lemma 2. If a validator u runs at height l, the lock PLock(B, l−
2) and V Lock(B′, l−2) will never be unlocked any more if it keeps
honest even validators are rushing.
Proof. Due to the condition n ≥ 4 f + 1, the number of all val-
idators n can be represented in form n = 4 f + k (1 ≤ k ≤ 4). By
assumption, because validator runs at height l, it must has received
a vote certificate cert for block blk 0 B′ at height l− 1. It means
that more than n− f = 3 f +k validators has V Lock(B′, l−2), and
there are at least n− 2 f = 2 f + k honest validators among them,
called honest validator set (HV S). But nodes in HV S may become
malicious at another round. For any block blk′ > B′, at most f
nodes in HV S vote for blk since at most f nodes change, and at
least f + k cannot vote for it. Hence, it’s impossible to create a
valid vote certificate for blk′ which can unlock u, because at most
n− ( f + k) = 3 f < n− f validators may vote for blk′. According
Lemma 1, PLock(B, l− 2) will never be unlocked any more as
well.
Each validator has to participant in the consensus for previous
height, hence it needs to keep a propose-lock and vote-lock for
previous height. According to Lemma 1, it is enough for each
validator to keep a vote-lock for last height and a propose-lock
for current height. For validator u who runs in round Rl,v, the
block that u is vote-locked on at height l′ (l′ ≤ l) is denoted by
V L(u)l′ . According to Lemma 2, block V L
(u)
l′ (l
′ ≤ l−2) will not be
changed any more.
Lemma 3. If honest validator u runs at round Rl,v(l > 2) and
another honest validator u′ runs at round Rl′,v′ such that l′ ≥ l,
V L(u)l−2 is the block that u locked on, then u
′ must be locked on
V L(u)l−2 at height l−2.
Proof. By the way of contradiction, assume validator u′ is locked
on another block V L(u
′)
l−2 such that V L
(u)
l−2 ` V L(u
′)
l−2. There must
be a height number h(h ≤ l − 2) satisfies that the ancestors of
block V L(u)l−2 and V L
(u′)
l−2 have identical PreHash at height h.
Therefore, block V L(u)h and V L
(u′)
h are comparable. It may assume
that V L(u)h < V L
(u′)
h , according to the proof Lemma 2, the vote
certificate for V L(u
′)
h cannot be derived by any validator. Conse-
quently, u′ cannot move to height l′. Hence, the origin lemma is
held.
Lemma 3 indicates that any two honest validators must vote-
lock on same block which is finalized after two block heights. This
property is vital to the correctness of consensus protocol.
3.4 Handling Proposals and Votes from Future Rounds
If a validator restarts from crash, it may receive proposals or votes
with valid vote certificate from future round. When validator u re-
ceives a vote certificate Cert for block B from a validator at height
l′ such that l′ ≥ l− 1, Cert is valid only if B 0 V L(u)l−2 according
to Lemma 3. At the beginning, we define the relationship between
validator and vote certificate in Definition 1.
Definition 1. We say a vote certificate Cert for B at round Rl′,v′
succeeds validator u running at Rl,v represented as Cert  u, if
one of the following conditions hold (i) Cert 0 V L(u)l−1, l
′ > l; (ii)
Cert 0V L(u)l−1, l
′ = l and u hasn’t vote for any block B′ that B′ > B;
(iii) Cert ` V L(u)l−1, the ancestor of B at height l− 1 is blk, then
blk >V L(u)l−1.
If a validator u receives a proposal or vote with vote certificate
succeeds itself, it means that u has fallen behind others. As shown
in Figure 2, validator u4 is the collector for round R10,0, but it is
running at height 8. Validator u4 receives a vote from u2 with a
Cert succeeding itself. If u receives a proposal containing Certl′,v′
succeeding itself, then it enter round Rl′+1,0 after synchronization
from others. Similarly, validator synchronizes data from others
upon receiving vote Vl′,v′ with Cert succeeding itself. If validator
is the collector for future round Rl′,v′ , it broadcasts the certificate
to help others catch up only once. However, fault validators can
create votes for future round easily and let honest validators
broadcast votes. For example, f honest validators run at round Rl,v,
but the others run at round Rl+2,0. Then faulty validators can send
7votes to Cl+2,1,Cl+2,2, · · · at the same time, and if they run at height
l, they broadcast vote certificate after synchronization. In this
situation, the complexity of communication is O(n f ) = O( 13 n
2).
We propose a mechanism to avoid O(n2) transmissions.
TOc(i) = 2i∆ (3a)
TOp(i) = TOc(i)+2i∆= 2i ·2∆ (3b)
It is known that each collector is elected by VRF according
to Equation (2). For round Rl,v, there is a unique collector Cl,v. If
adversary wants to let honest validator u broadcast vote certificate,
it must calculate a correct VRF for a round whose collector is u,
otherwise u cannot make sure it’s the collector for that round.
To avoid starting a view change too soon, the Timeout for the
next round doubles if timer for current round expires in LinSBFT.
We define the Timeout TOc(i) and TOp(i) for the i−th round
at each height in Equation 3. The collector waits TOc(i) time and
enter the (i+1)-th round without collecting n− f votes. Validators
enter (i + 1)-th after TOp(i) time without receiving proposal
from collector. For round Rl′,v′ , adversary needs to wait at least
∑v
′−1
i=0 TOp(i) before sending vote Vl′,v′ to Cl′,v′ . When a validator
receives vote with Cert ′ from future round Rl′,v′ , it verifies whether
it is the collector for that round at first. According to Lemma 2,
Cert ′ cannot conflict with block V L(u)l−2, otherwise it is invalid.
Then it calculates the minimized transmit time DUR(l− 2, l′,v′)
from the creation of block V L(u)l−2 to round Rl′,v′ as Equation (4).
DUR(h,h′,r′) = (h′−h)∆t f +
r′−1
∑
i=0
TOp(i)
= (h′−h)∆t f +
r′−1
∑
i=0
2i ·2∆
= (h′−h)∆t f +
(
2r
′ −1
)
·2∆
(4)
In Equation (4), ∆t f is the minimized time to finish a round to
achieve consensus. The duration is at least (h′− h)t f from round
Rh,0 to round Rh′,0 and the minimized transmit time from round
Rh′,0 to round Rh′,r′ is ∑v
′−1
i=0 TOp(i). For validator u, the duration
from the time of creation of V L(u)l−2 to now is ∆T . If ∆T <DUR(l−
2, l′,v′), validator just rejects the vote and do nothing since nobody
can move to round Rl′,v′ within ∆T . As presented in Lemma 4, the
complexity of transmissions caused by future votes is O(n). The
proof of Lemma 4 is shown in Appendix A.1.
Lemma 4. With the negligible probability, the number of valida-
tors who broadcast vote certificate is constant.
4 COMPLETE PROTOCOL
4.1 Consensus Algorithm
In addition to steps of Propose and Prepare, we introduce a
new step called Finalize in which a validator finalizes block and
executes transactions of it, resulting in the transition of local state
machine. In general, for each round, every validator experiences
threes steps in order: Propose, Finalize and Prepare. In Propose
step, collector(leader) proposes block, others receive them from
collectors. In Finalize step, all validators finalize block proposed
two height before. After that, in Prepare step, every validator
sends vote to collector and collector collects these votes to derive
a threshold signature.
Algorithm 1 describes the framework of LinSBFT protocol
and Algorithm 2 is the details of processes for proposal and vote
used in Algorithm 1. Algorithm 3 presents necessary procedures
Algorithm 1: LinSBFT protocol framework
1 local variables
2 Rh,r: the round u runs at
3 r′: the last round at height h−1
4 Tc,Tp: timer for collection and proposal
5 B: received block for current height of u
6 /*Event on validator*/
7 upon reception of m =
〈
PROPOSE,Pl,v
〉
s do
8 cert← vote certificate in Pl,v
9 if cert  u then
10 handleFuturePropsal(Pl,v) /∗Algorithm2∗/
11 else if cert 0V L(u)h−1 then
12 handleProposal(Pl,v) /∗Algorithm2∗/
13 upon timer Tp for Rl,v expires do
14 if l = h−1 then
15 r′← r′+1
16 enterPrepare
(
h,r′,V L(u)h−1
)
/∗Algorithm3∗/
17 else if l = h then
18 r← r+1
19 enterPrepare(h,r,B) /∗Algorithm3∗/
20 upon reception of m =
〈
CERT,Certl,v
〉
s do
21 if Certl,v  u then
22 synchronize(Certl,v, l,v) /∗Algorithm3∗/
23 if Certl,v > PL
(u)
h then
24 PUnlock(h), PLock(Bl,v,h)
25 /*Event on collector(leader)*/
26 upon reception of m =
〈
VOT E,Vl,v
〉
s do
27 cert← vote certificate in Vl,v
28 if cert  u then
29 handleFutureVote(Vl,v,cert) /∗Algorithm2∗/
30 else if cert 0V L(u)h−1 then
31 handleVote(Vl,v) /∗Algorithm2∗/
32 upon timer Tc for Rl,v expires do
33 enterPropose(l,v+1) /∗Algorithm3∗/
used in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, including the transfer
functions among three steps and the synchronize procedure. These
events and procedures are divided into two kinds, one runs on
normal validators (including the collector) and the other runs on
collector(leader). For brevity, the verification and check of mes-
sages are omitted. As discussed before, each validator participants
the protocol for previous height to help others move to larger
height. Therefore, each validator record the last round number r′
at previous height. In LinSBFT, any process is triggered by some
given events such as reception of message and expiry of timer.
We discuss the process for reception of Proposal, Vote and Cert
message. If timer Tc expires, it means that collector cannot receive
n− f votes within a timespan, and if proposal does not arrive in
time, the timer Tp for proposal expires as well.
At the beginning, we discuss the process of proposal broadcast
by leader of each round. First, when validator u receives a proposal
Pl,v containing a vote certificate cert succeeding itself, which
means u has fallen behind others, it synchronizes data from others
at once and enter round Rl,0 (Algorithm 1, line 8-10). Otherwise,
if the certificate cert does not conflict with locked block V L(u)h−1 of
u, it handles the proposal to transmit its state machine by function
handleProposal (Algorithm 1, line 11-12), which is detailed in
Algorithm 2. Second, in Algorithm 2, when receives proposal
containing the certificate for current round Rh,r(Algorithm 2, line
4-9), which is the ordinary case of LinSBFT, u enters round Rh+1,0
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1 (local variables are the same as Algorithm 1)
2 /*Procedure on validator*/
3 procedure handleProposal(Pl,v)do
4 if Rh+1,0 = Rl,v then
5 V Lock(B,h), B← block of Pl,v, PLock(B,h+1)
6 h← l,r′← r,r← v
7 /*finalize block after two phases of voting*/
8 enterFinalize
(
V L(u)l−2
)
/∗Algorithm3∗/
9 enterPrepare(h,r,B) /∗Algorithm3∗/
10 else if Rh,r+1 = Rl,v then
11 /*Pl,v cannot unlock validator*/
12 r← r+1, B← block of Pl,v
13 enterPrepare(h,r,B) /∗Algorithm3∗/
14 else if Rh−1,r′+1 = Rl,v then
15 r′← r′+1
16 send vote for V L(u)h−1 to collector Ch−1,r′
17 procedure handleFutureProposal(Pl,v,cert)do
18 synchronize(cert, l,v) /∗Algorithm3∗/
19 handleProposal(Pl,v) /∗Algorithm3∗/
20 /*Procedure on collector(leader)*/
21 procedure handleVote(Vl,v)do
22 add Vl,v to vote set for Rl,v
23 if collect n− f votes for Rl,v then
24 enterPropose(l+1,0) /∗Algorithm3∗/
25 procedure handleFutureVote(Vl,v,cert)do
26 /*u has fallen behind others*/
27 if DUR(h−2, l,v) is valid then
28 synchronize(cert, l,v) /∗Algorithm3∗/
29 broadcast message 〈CERT,cert〉
30 handleVote(Vl,v) /∗Algorithm2∗/
and update its local variables, resulting in that u is vote-locked on
current block B at height h and propose-locked on block of Pl,v
at height h+ 1(Algorithm 2, line 4-5). Then, validator moves to
Finalize step (Algorithm 2, line 8), in which validator finalizes
block V L(u)l−2 if it is not finalized before(Algorithm 3, line 13-
15). In Prepare step(Algorithm 2, line 9), u sends its vote to the
collector and sets a timer Tp for proposal(Algorithm 3, 17-19). If
u is the collector responsible for collection of votes from others,
it sets a timer Tc for collection(Algorithm 3, line 20-21). Third, if
the received proposal is for round Rh,r+1, it means the collector
Ch,r cannot collect at least n− f votes to derive a threshold
signature before the expiry of timer Tc, therefore u enter round
Rh,r+1 and sends votes for proposed block to collector(Algorithm
2, line 8-11). Last, when receives proposal for previous height, if
the proposed block is identical to validator’s vote-locked block, it
sends vote for V L(u)h−1 along with latest vote certificate to collector
Ch−1,r′ at height h−1(Algorithm 2, line 12-14). Otherwise, u just
ignores the proposal for the safety of protocol.
We then present the process of vote messages sent by val-
idators. A validator just handles a vote message if it is the
collector for round of the vote, otherwise the vote message is
discarded by it. In Algorithm 1, if Vl,v is a vote for future round
(Algorithm 1, line 29-30), u changes to synchronize data from
other validators after verifying the duration time(Algorithm 2, line
26-31). Upon receiving vote Vl,v for current round, collector u adds
Vl,v to local vote set. If u collects more than n− f votes, it enters
Propose step for round Rh+1,0 and doesn’t handle votes for Rh,r
any more(Algorithm 2, line 19-21). In Propose step, the collector
propose a new block along with a Cert derived based on votes to
all validators including itself(Algorithm 3, line 6-11).
Algorithm 3: Functions for LinSBFT protocol
1 (local variables are the same as Algorithm 1)
2 /*Procedure on validator*/
3 procedure enterFinalize(blk)do
4 if blk not finalized then
5 applyBlock(blk)
6 procedure enterPrepare(l,v,B)do
7 vote← createVote(B)
8 send vote vote to collector Cl,v
9 setTimer(Tp, l,v)
10 if u is the collector for R(l,v) then
11 setTimer(Tc, l,v)
12 procedure synchronize(cert, l,v)do
13 if cert 0V L(u)h−1 then
14 synchronize block Bh−1,r′ and Bh,r
15 VUnlock(h−1), V Lock(Bh−1,r′ ,h−1), PUnlock(l)
16 for i from h+1 to l do
17 synchronize block Bi,vi
18 V Lock(Bi−1,vi−1 , i−1), PLock(Bi,vi , i)
19 r′← r,r← 0,h← h+1
20 /*Procedure on collector(leader)*/
21 procedure enterProprose(l,v)do
22 if u not have proposed for Rl,v then
23 if PL(u)l 6= nil and Rh,r+1 = Rl,v then
24 broadcast Proposal containing PL(u)l
25 else
26 cert← createCert(l,v), blk← createBlock()
27 proposal← makeProposal(blk,cert)
28 broadcast proposal
Last, we discuss the process of expiry of timer and Cert
message. If timer Tp expires, validator just enters round Rl,v+1 and
sends vote along with latest Cert to the next collector(Algorithm 1,
line 14-19). A validator proposes its vote-locked block for previ-
ous height when it becomes the collector for previous height, since
it has to participate the protocol for previous height(Algorithm 1,
line 14-16). If timer Tc expires, it means as a collector, u cannot re-
ceive votes from super-majority within given timespan(Algorithm
1, line 33-34). Therefore, u enters Propose step for next round and
proposes the block PL(u)l if any(Algorithm 3, line 24-25). It notes
that u just creates a new block if it doesn’t have a propose-lock at
height l(Algorithm 3, 25-30). Upon receiving Cert message with
vote certificate cert, if cert  u, validator u synchronizes data as
well and update local Propose-Lock and Vote-Lock(Algorithm 1,
line 20-24).
4.2 Handling Changes in Participant Set
Participant set update. Since there is a large setup cost for
generating and exchanging keys as described in Section 2.1,
the participant set cannot change too frequently. For instance,
exchanging public keys and IP addresses between each pair of
nodes already take O(n2) transmissions. In the literature, such
costs are often hidden by assuming the existence of a central-
ized public-key infrastructure (PKI), which is not practical in a
permissionless, public blockchain setting. To amortize the setup
costs, LinBFT divides time into epochs of length O(n), and
nodes can only join or leave at the beginning of each epoch.
Each update to the participant set (i.e., a validator join or leave
request) is simply treated as a transaction, which will be included
in a new block to be added to the blockchain. The rationale is
that since LinSBFT guarantees deterministic safety and liveness,
9there must be deterministic consensus over the next participant
set. Specifically, at the end of epoch E , the set of join/leave
requests contained in finalized blocks determine the changes in
the participant set in epoch E +1. In the worst case, these involve
O(n) join/leave transactions, e.g., when the entire participant set is
replaced. LinSBFT needs to run a DKG protocol to generate new
public/private key pairs for each participant in epoch E +1, which
are required for creating threshold signatures. Note that LinSBFT
does not update keys incrementally, i.e., the key pair of a staying
participant from epoch E is still generated from scratch. This is
because updating keys for threshold signature is tricky in general.
Proof-of-Stake (PoS). PoS is a common technique to counter
Sybil attacks, i.e., one single person or entity pretends to be many
participants by registering numerous accounts in the system. In
the presence of such attacks, it is no longer appropriate to define
BFTs honest super-majority requirement based on the number of
nodes, since multiple nodes can belong to the same entity. PoS
addresses this problem by mandating that each participant deposits
to a special account a certain amount of money (call its stake) in
the form of cryptocurrency tokens of the blockchain. The stake can
only be withdrawn after the participant quits the protocol. Clearly,
under PoS, the number of accounts that a single person or entity
can register is limited by its financial resources. If a node wants to
join consensus in epoch E +1, it proposes a transaction to deposit
a certain amount tokens in epoch E . The top n nodes who deposit
most tokens are considered as the validators in consensus of epoch
E +1.
PoS can also be implemented with different participants stak-
ing different amount of tokens, and having influence proportional
to their respective stakes. Instead, in LinSBFT, all validators
promise equal influence to consensus. In order to provide an
incentive, LinSBFT protocol rewards the validators who partic-
ipant in consensus of current epoch. There are two sources for
this reward W : transaction fees and coinbase, which a continuous
supply of new coins without mining in PoW. The incentive W of
block B is owned by the leader who propose B. In some system
(e.g. Ethermint 2), the reward of each block is shared by all
validators, where a malicious node still gains reward according
to protocol although it stops working after joining in consensus
in epoch E . In LinSBFT, every round is assigned a new leader
via VRF which is unpredictable in advance, thereby rewards
of all validators are equal in expectation. Furthermore, if hope
the reward of each validator is proportional to its deposition,
we can adjust the probability that a validator is elected as the
leader/collector. Suppose the amount of token deposited by node i
(0 ≤ i ≤ n−1) is a integer di, and the sum is D = ∑n−1i=0 di. Then,
node becomes the leader/colletor Cl,v when H(Certl−2,v′ |v) mod n
is greater than ∑i−1j=0 d j and no more than ∑
i
j=0 d j. By this method,
an absent validator cannot gain any reword according to incentive
mechanism of LinSBFT.
5 CORRECTNESS
This section sketches the proofs that LinSBFT provides safety,
liveness and linear complexity.
Safety: Given n ≥ 4 f + 1, at each height, at most one block is
finalized and added to the blockchain. Claim 1 establishes the
safety of LinSBFT.
2. https://github.com/cosmos/ethermint
Claim 1. Let Bl,v be a block finalized by an honest validator u.
Then, there is no other block Bl′,v′ that can be finalized by any
honest validator such that l′ ≤ l and Bl,v ` Bl′,v′ .
Proof. By assumption, u at least runs at height l + 2 due to the
finalization of Bl,v. Then any locked block V L
(u)
h (h ≤ l) never
be unlocked any more according to Lemma 2. Hence, Bl′,v′ will
never be finalized by u. For other honest validator, by the way
of contradiction, assume the block Bl′,v′ is finalized by honest
validator u′. According to the finalization of Bl′,v′ , u′ must be
locked on Bl′,v′ at height l′. The ancestor of Bl,v at height l′ is
V L(u)l′ , then it must be that V L
(u)
l′ ` Bl′,v′ since Bl,v ` Bl′,v′ . But this
is impossible according Lemma 3.
Note that when a malicious validator becomes honest, it
will drop all invalid blocks finalized within the period of fault.
Therefore, there is single chain of blocks in the view of any
validator who is honest at any round.
Liveness: As discussed in Section 3.2, to provide liveness, view
change is triggered and the protocol enters a new round when the
timer Tp expires. It is important to maximize the period of time
when at least n− f honest validators are in the same round, and
to ensure that this period of time increases exponentially until a
valid proposal is received.
Like in PBFT, the Timeout TOp(v + 1) for round Rl,v+1
doubles if the timer expires for round Rl,v to ensure as many
validators as possible enter same round. If a validator falls behind
others, it synchronizes data from others to enter the latest round
upon receiving a Cert succeeding itself. The unlocking mechanism
also promises the liveness that prevents a validator from being
locked forever. In addition, for every round, the collector is elected
by VRF. Therefore, the probability that collector is malicious for
more than I consecutive rounds becomes negligible (i.e., smaller
than a given ρ) such that (I > logpρ).
A realistic assumption made in in-production systems, e.g.
Google Spanner [10], is that validators have access to a globally
synchronized clock with a known bounded skew. We implement
the periodic synchronization based on synchronized clock to help
the delayed validators catch up. For every time period T = O(n),
every validator broadcasts a State message for synchronization.
In Equation (5), Rl,v is the round in which a validator runs at,
and Cert is the latest commit certificate owned by the validator.
Therefore, each validator broadcasts a State message after time
xT (x = 1,2, ...).
S = 〈Cert, l,v〉 (5)
First, whenever a validator receives a State message with Cert
succeeding itself, it synchronizes data from others as before. Once
a validator receives n− f same Cert for a block at the current
height, it accepts Cert and move to next height. Second, upon
receiving n− f State messages with larger round number than
itself at current height, validator jumps to the round with smallest
round number.
The manner of periodic synchronization guarantees that the
delayed validator knows the latest state of consensus and takes its
initiative to synchronize data from others to enter larger height.
The Claim 2 guarantees the liveness of LinSBFT, and the proof is
presented in Appendix A.2.
Claim 2. In a partially synchronous network, LinSBFT reaches
consensus for any block height within finite time.
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Fig. 4: Throughput in the ordinary case with varying block size and number of validators.
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Fig. 5: Latency in the ordinary case with varying block size and number of validators.
Linear complexity: LinSBFT terminates at each block height af-
ter amortized-O(n) transmissions with the tricks of LVC, threshold
signature and VRF, unless with negligible probability. Claim 3
states the linear complexity of LinSBFT. Note that the messages
sent by malicious validators are not counted and we only consider
the messages sent during the network is synchronized. In an
asynchrony network, any agreement cannot be reached, therefore
it makes no sense to count these messages.
Claim 3. In a partially synchronous network, unless with negli-
gible probability, LinSBFT terminates after amortized-O(n) trans-
missions at each block height.
Proof. In the ordinary case, the size of threshold signature is
constant and the consensus is achieved with single round. For
malicious collector, it may take no more than constant of rounds
to reach agreement as discussed in Section 3.2. As discussed
in Section 3.4, faulty validators can lead honest validators to
broadcast proposals by sending future votes to them. According
to Lemma 4, the number of validators broadcasting messages
is constant. The probability that the next collector is malicious
becomes negligible after a constant number of collector changes
according to the VRF. Therefore, in total, the transmissions for the
consensus of each block height are O(n).
6 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We implemented LinSBFT in the PChain platform3, with open
APIs to testers and developers. PChain is backward compatible
with all Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) instructions. Hence,
smart contract transactions for Ethereum can be executed in
PChain without modification. Digital signature and VRF are
implemented using the BN256 elliptic curve [22], and the hash
function is Keccak-256 as in Ethereum. Each validator maintains
a TCP connection with its peers, and all validators are reachable
3. https://www.pchain.org/cn
with each other via the P2P network. The PChain TestNet is
deployed in a cluster of virtual machine instances on Amazon
EC2, scattered in several geographic regions including North
America, Europe, and Asia. In our experiments, each node is
equipped with 16 CPU cores running at 2.10GHz, 96GB RAM,
3TB disk space and up to 1 Gbps network throughput (throttled
in our experiments). We compare our system to IstanbulBFT4
and Ethermint, which are also in-production BFT protocols for
Ethereum-compatible systems. We do not compare to research
prototypes that have not been tested in production, since imple-
mentation details can affect performance significantly, as we show
below.
We vary the number of validators from 2 to 64. Each machine
continuously generates transactions with multiple threads, and
these transactions are gossiped to all validators. We employ a
dataset collected from the PChain TestNet in our experiments.
To ensure that the consensus overhead dominates overall latency
rather than CPU time consumed by the EVM, we limit the
experiments to token transfer smart contract transactions.
We evaluate the LinSBFT on two metrics: throughput and
transaction latency in terms of total wallclock time. In order to
conduct a comprehensive evaluation, we also simulated validators
with no fault, fail-stop faults and byzantine faults, respectively. In
the no-fault setting, we test throughput and wallclock time for all
systems, with number of transactions (T Xs) in a block varying
from 2000 to 8000. We also deployed all systems in a limited-
bandwidth setting to show the advantages of LinSBFT’s lower
overall transmission volume. In the setting with faulty validators,
we test the throughput and response time of all BFT systems with
different timeout parameter λ ; a timeout triggers the view change
subprotocol necessary for ensuring liveness. Regarding the Byzan-
tine fault setting, it is infeasible to simulate all possible attack
strategies to test the safety of LinSBFT (guaranteed by Claim
1). Our experiments consider the following strategies: remaining
4. https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/650
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Fig. 6: Throughput and latency with faulty validators.
silent (called crash fault) and sending different messages to a
subset of validators (Byzantine fault), and demonstrate LinSBFT’s
robustness in the presence of such malicious validators.
6.1 Performance with No Fault
Throughput. Figs.4(a)-4(c) illustrate the throughput for the three
BFT systems in the case where there is no faulty validator. To
avoid view change, we set the timeout parameter λ to a large
value for all systems. Compared to IstanbulBFT and Ethermint,
LinSBFT obtains consistently higher throughput in terms of trans-
actions per second (TPS). The reason is that LinSBFT needs only
a single phase of voting to achieve consensus. Besides, although
the network condition is favorable (1Gbps bandwidth), the use of
threshold signature in LinSBFT still improves performance, as it
avoids broadcasting and collecting O(n) voting messages at each
node, as is done in IstanbulBFT and Ethermint. The performance
gain of LinSBFT is more pronounced as the number of validators
increases.
As expected, the throughput for all systems increase with
the number of transactions per block. It is worth noting that
when the size of participant set is small (< 3), each validator
proposes the number of transactions is less than the size of block
because verification of signatures consumes most of CPU time.
The performance of Ethermint is significantly lower than the other
two systems due to its protocol implementation details, which is
discussed in the following latency analysis.
Latency. Figs. 5(a)-5(c) show the latency for all three systems.
In Figure 5, the top of each bar represents execution time for trans-
actions and the bottom represents the time of reaching consensus
per block. Figs. 5(a)-5(c) illustrate that Ethermint has the highest
time overhead for transaction execution, while IstanbulBFT and
LinSBFT incur similar transaction execution time. The reason is
that when finalizing a block, Ethermint needs to send an extra
deliver tx RPC request for each transaction to Ethereum for
execution. In addition, Ethermint needs to recheck all transactions
in Tendermint’s mempool by sending check tx RPC requests
to Ethereum after the finalization of a block to delete invalid
transactions (e.g., double spending ones). For the sake of fairness,
we turn off the recheck function of Ethermint. We have verified
that the execution overhead of block dominates time cost in all
systems, when the number of validators is small. As the number
of participants increases, the consensus time overhead increases
because more validators lead to more time to broadcast messages,
especially in IstanbulBFT and Ethermint. Under favorable network
conditions, in general the bottleneck lies not in network traffic
of consensus, but in transaction execution, as shown in Figure
5(c). Nevertheless, LinSBFT only consumes half of the time of
IstanbulBFT, thanks to its single-phase voting design and linear-
communication achieved via threshold signatures. Ethermint takes
more time for consensus than IstanbulBFT and LinSBFT, since
the former’s underlying Tendermint software partitions a block
into parts with size of 64KB and broadcasts each parts concur-
rently. Similar to throughput of three systems, with the number
of transactions in each block increasing, the time cost of three
systems increases correspondingly.
Limited bandwidth experiments. To determine the effec-
tiveness of LinSBFT’s reduction in communication overhead, we
throttle the bandwidth for each validator to 1Mbps and 8Mbps
with a fixed block size of T Xs = 4000. Figs. 4(d) and 5(d) show
the TPS and total time with 1Mbps bandwidth. The throughput
of all systems decreases quickly with increasing number of val-
idators, which indicate that communication cost has become the
bottleneck. Note that when the number of validators reaches 64
in Figure 4(d), Ethermint and IstanbulBFT can no longer obtain
consensus, despite their theoretical liveness guarantees.
In terms of throughput, the performance gap between LinS-
BFT and IstanbulBFT/Ethermint increases with the number of
validators, due to their linear and quadratic transmission volume,
respectively. With 8Mbps bandwidth, LinSBFT achieves 497 and
173 TPS with 32 and 64 participants while Istanbul only has 132
and 28 TPS respectively. Results about 8Mbps are omitted due to
space limitations. Results on total wallclock time, shown in Figure
5(d), lead to similar conclusions, with LinSBFT consistently and
significantly outperforming its competitors.
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6.2 Performance with Faulty Nodes
Crash faults. We first evaluate the throughput and latency of
the three systems with crash faults. The number of validators
is fixed to 16, meaning that a BFT protocol can tolerant up
to 5 faulty validators. Figs. 6(a)-6(h) show the results with the
number of faulty validators varying from 1 to 5. In Figs. 6(b) and
6(c), the block size is 2000 and 4000 transactions, respectively.
In Figs. 6(a) and 6(b), timeout parameter λ is set to 10s and
3s, respectively. Observe that with increasing number of faulty
validators, throughput generally decreases since crashed validators
lead to timeouts and expensive view changes. More faulty valida-
tors lead to more frequent view changes, and thus, larger costs.
With a high λ , LinSBFT and IstanbulBFT demonstrate similar
performance. When λ becomes lower as shown in Figs. 6(b) and
6(c), LinSBFT has significant advantage over IstanbulBFT and
Ethermint. Similar to the ordinary case, a larger block size results
in higher performance with fault validators. Notes that validators
in IstanbulBFT can no longer achieve consensus in the setting with
5 fault validators and λ = 10s.
Figs. 6(d)-6(e) show that total running time of all systems
increases with the number of faulty validators. We measure the
average time cost for transaction execution and consensus per
block. As we expected, a larger λ results in higher wall clock
time for consensus. Notably, when λ is relatively small, LinSBFT
achieves 1.5x performance boost compared to IstanbulBFT, in
terms of TPS.
Byzantine faults. Finally, we evaluate the performance of
all systems in the presence of Byzantine faults. Figs. 6(f)-6(h)
illustrate that throughput of all systems decreases with increas-
ing number of faulty validators, as expected. Compared to the
results with crash faults, the performance of all three systems
has declined to varying degrees due to the locking mechanism of
systems. Specifically, we assume that when a malicious validator
becomes a leader (collector), it only sends messages to half of
the honest validators, who may be locked on the proposal until
a locked validator becomes the leader. Compared to Ethermint
and IstanbulBFT, the performance degradation of LinSBFT is
the lowest, since the Propose-Lock makes a successful collector
propose the locked block that the locked validators may vote
for. However, with consecutive faulty collectors, LinSBFT incurs
increased overhead due to locking, and requires more rounds to
change to an honest collector. Due to space limitations, results on
wallclock time are omitted, which lead to similar conclusions as
those for crash fault. In practice, we expect the proportion of faulty
validators to be low, since such behavior can be disincentivized
via the block reward mechanism, which is outside the scope of
this paper.
7 RELATED WORK
BFT protocols have been extensively studied in the traditional
distributed systems setting. An early influential work is the DLS
protocol [12], which achieves safety and liveness, at the expense of
prohibitive O(n4) communication cost. Castro and Liskov propose
PBFT [7], which incurs O(n2) transmissions in the ordinary case.
As pointed out in [1], this is essentially an optimistic run, and the
protocol falls back to DLS when the optimistic run fails. Later
work, e.g., Zyzzyva [19], further improves the efficiency of the
optimistic run.
In traditional BFT researches [7], [19], [21] discussed above, it
is commonly assumed that there is a fixed cluster of verifier nodes.
Meanwhile, in many protocols, the same node stays as the leader
unless a view change occurs. Further, an honest node is assumed
to stay honest, regardless of the number of transaction batches it
verifies. These assumptions are unrealistic in a public blockchain
setting. Tendermint [4], based on PBFT, runs consensus for each
block with a rotating leader scheme, which is more suitable for
blockchains. However, Tendermint still incurs O(n3) worst-case
communication volume, and its adaptation Ethermint has been
shown to perform poorly in our experiments.
Recently, Casper [5] amortizes the cost of its BFT protocol by
running consensus once for multiple (100 in [5]) block heights.
This design, however, gives much power to the block proposer.
Hence, Casper involves a PoW mechanism for leader selection,
which runs the risk of forks and 51% attacks. Hot-Stuff [1] im-
proves the worst case communication complexity to O(n2), using
a combination of linear view change and threshold signatures.
SBFT [15] reduces the communication complexity of the ordinary
case using threshold signatures and collectors. Omniledger [18]
achieves O(logn) time in the best case, with the help of the CoSi
protocol [28]. Several protocols distinguish malicious nodes who
actively attack the protocol with falsified messages from ones that
may fail-top (e.g., in [15]) or those that may go offline [25], and
obtain stronger robustness in a setting where only a small fraction
of nodes are actively malicious. None of these protocols, however,
have been deployed in production for a large-scale blockchain
network.
Another promising trend is BFT protocols with probabilistic
guarantees on safety and liveness. Dfinity [17] uses a random
sample set of nodes to verify a block. Since its safety guarantee
is probabilistic, the sample set needs to be sufficiently large to
obtain a low probability of failure. Hence, it still needs a scalable,
deterministic BFT sub-protocol for the sample set. Algorand [14]
addresses the situation where the adversary is adaptive, who can
instantly corrupt any node at will. As pointed out by Chan et al.
[8], Algorand replies on a public key infrastructure, which may
not exist in a public blockchain. LinSBFT does not consider an
adaptive adversary since (i) for a fast protocol, compromising
validators adaptively within a round is rather difficult, and (ii) the
only part of the protocol that is vulnerable to an adaptive dversary
is random leader selection, for which the adversary can break the
probabilistic guarantee on O(1) leader rotations by corrupting a
considerable portion of the nodes; this is difficult, however, for a
larger n.
Finally, consensus protocols based on Directed Acyclic Graphs
(DAG) [2], [9], [20] seek consensus on individual transactions
rather than blocks, and confirm them concurrently by expanding
a hash-linked graph of transactions. Such approaches, however,
generally do not guarantee bounded latency, as a new transaction
can wait indefinitely until another chooses to confirm it.
8 CONCLUSIONS
The paper proposes LinSBFT, an in-production BFT protocol that
achieves amortized O(n) communication cost, requires only a
single phase of voting in the ordinary case, satisfies deterministic
guarantees on safety and liveness, and is suitable for a public,
permissionless blockchain setting with a dynamic validator set
and potentially changing honesty. Experiments with real data
demonstrate the advantages of LinSBFT in terms of throughput
and latency, under various assumptions of node faults. Regarding
future work, an interesting direction is to investigate the combi-
nation of LinSBFT with a randomized BFT protocol, as well as
other scaling options such as sharding [18].
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APPENDIX A
A.1 Future Proposals and Votes
Lemma 4. Unless with the negligible probability, the number of
validators who broadcast proposal is constant.
Proof. First, we proof that, in expectation, an honest validator
takes 4/3 view changes to a round with honest collector. Assume
it takes I view changes for a validator to enter a round whose
collector is honest. The collector is malicious for each round with
a probability p= f/n, and probability that I equals i is Pr[I = i] =
pi−1 (1− p). The expectation of I is calculated as follow:
E(I) =
∞
∑
i=1
iPr[I = i] = (1− p)
∞
∑
i=1
ipi−1
= (1− p)
(
∞
∑
i=1
ixi−1
)∣∣∣∣
x=p
= (1− p)
(
∞
∑
i=1
(
xi
)′)∣∣∣∣
x=p
= (1− p)
(
∞
∑
i=1
xi
)′ ∣∣∣∣
x=p
= (1− p)
(
x
1− x
)′ ∣∣∣∣
x=p
= (1− p)(1− x)−2
∣∣∣∣
x=p
= (1− p)−1 < (1−1/4)−1 = 4
3
Second, the probability that the next collector is malicious
becomes negligible after a constant number(I >− log4ρ) through
random leader selection. In practice, number I floats around E(I)
in the vast majority of cases. Hence, the consensus for each height
is terminated after constant number of rounds.
Last, if malicious validators want more honest validators to
broadcast messages, they have to send future votes to honest
collector. However, the calculated collectors may be fault with
a probability p as well. It makes no sense to send future vote to a
fault validator. In order to win more time, malicious validator just
remain silent. During the time for view change, valid future votes
are produced. If there are I consecutive malicious collectors, at
most I valid votes are produce and expectation of I is not greater
than 4/3. When an honest validator becomes the collector runs
at largest height, it propose a block with its largest Cert that can
help delayed validator catch up. In addition, the honest validator
sends its vote with largest Cert to corresponding collector. An
honest collector for future round broadcasts a Cert message to
notify others upon receiving a vote certificate succeeding itself.
Hence, with the negligible probability, the number of validators
who broadcast proposal is constant.
A.2 Correctness for Liveness
In this part, we presents the proof of Claim 2 described in Section
5 via three lemmas.
Lemma 5. Let xT be a time after GST. It supposes that l is the
maximum height number of all honest validators. Then by xT +∆,
all honest validators at least move to height l−1.
Proof. The honest validators running at height l broadcast State
messages with largest vote certificates for height l− 1. The val-
idators staying height l′(l′ ≤ l−2) synchronize data and move to
height l upon receiving these State messages with vote certificates
succeeding themselves. Therefore, all honest validators run at
height not less than l−1.
Lemma 6. Let xT be a time after GST. It supposes that l is the
largest height number of all honest validators. Then all honest
validators must move to height l eventually.
Proof. If all honest validators run at height l, the lemma is held.
Otherwise, there must be valiators stay at height less than l.
According to Lemma 5, all honest validators move to at least
height l − 1 by xT + ∆. The validators running at height l − 1
will move to higher height after synchronization upon receiving
certificate succeeding itself. In addition, all validators participant
in consensus for height l− 1 even some of them run at height l.
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Due to the doubling of Timeout, all validators enter same round
after a round number r at height l− 1 forever. With negligible
probability, there must be honest collectors for two successive
rounds, say r′,r′+1 such that r′> r. In round Rl−1,r′ , the certificate
Cert owned by honest validator for a round at height l− 1 that
can vote-unlocks and propose-unlocks all other honest validators
must be sent to collector Cl−1,r′ . If Cl−1,r′ can not derive a
vote certificate, it proposes the block matched Cert that will be
accepted by all validators. Hence, collector Cl−1,r′+1 can produce a
valid vote certificate which let all honest validators move to height
l. If we set multiple collectors, as long as one of k collectors for
round Rl−1,r′+1 is the honest, validators move to height l and the
lemma is held.
Lemma 7. It supposes that l is the highest height of all honest
validators. At least one honest validator must move to height l+1
eventually.
Proof. If there are more than n− f validators running at height
l, and a vote certificate Cert is derived for round at height l.
When Cert is broadcast by anyone, all honest validators move
to height l + 1 at once. Otherwise, according to Lemma 6, all
honest validators must move to height l. We suppose the r is the
maximum round number of all honest validators when they all
move to height l. Then all honest validator will enter same round
after round r forever due to the doubling of timeout. After round
Rl,r, as long as the collector is honest, there must be one honest
validator that moves to height l+1. Besides, there is at least one
honest validator moving to height l+ 1 if the malicious collector
partitions honest validators deliberately by sending message to
part of honest validators. Hence, the lemma is held.
According to the proofs for above three lemmas, there must
be honest validator moving to larger height forever, therefore the
consensus for each block height must terminate within finite time
in a partially synchronous network.
